































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Even though the theoretical rationale for this type of risk management is well understood,
applying it at Cephalon raises a number of issues that may help us to direct empirical research,
understand corporate decision-making, and sharpen risk management theory:
•  Risk management choices are made in a rich corporate context.  Here, accounting rules (and
managers’ interpretation of their impact on firm value) have a critical effect on the firm’s
risk management choices. In this case, the rationale for risk management seems as much
motivated by managing earnings as by managing cash flows.
•  Risk  management  is  usually  motivated  by  the  presence  of  deadweight  costs,  either  of
financing or financial distress.  However, if managing risk itself also entails deadweight
costs, then firms must compare relative deadweight costs.  Our analysis suggests that they
may be large when equity derivatives are used to manage risk.
 
•  Academic  models  of  risk  management  require  managers  to  measure  the  size  of  these
deadweight costs, but provide little guidance about how to calculate these costs.  We found
little reliable data that a manager could use to benchmark the costs of external financing. As
an  empirical  matter,  in  this  case,  deadweight  costs  of  financing  may  be  quite  small  or
possibly even negative.
•  Risk  management  decisions  seem  motivated  as  much  by  fluctuations  in  the  cost  and
availability  of  financing  as  by  fluctuations  in  either  operating  cash  flows  or  desired
investment.
 
•    While firms can hedge market-wide risks, they are often unable to protect against purely
idiosyncratic business risks except by using insurance.   This clinical study documents a
firm  using  the  capital  markets  to  manage  a  combination  of  an  idiosyncratic  risk  and
financing uncertainty.
•    Finally, even in this clinical study, where management was quite clear in its explanation of
its  objectives,  one  cannot  reject  an  alternative  explanation  that  the  transaction  simply
allowed the firm to bet on the success of its drug.
We  have  two  goals  in  documenting  this  transaction.  First,  we  seek  to  communicate  to
academics the richness of practice that is often ignored in abstract risk-management theory. We do
so to encourage natural extensions to existing theory, such as acknowledging potential deadweight
costs of managing risk. Second, we hope to highlight for managers analyses that could be used to
approach risk management decisions, such as alternative ways to measure the deadweight costs of
financing.   In general, our goal is to help build a bridge between abstract risk management theory
and its concrete use by firms.3
We provide readers with details on the company’s risk management problem (in section II
of the paper), briefly summarize the theory of cash-flow hedging (section III), and describe the
relationship between these two (section IV).   We also value the options purchased by Cephalon in
section V to determine the deadweight costs of the risk management strategy.  A separate Appendix
(available from the authors) details the technical treatment of this valuation, which is complicated
by  the  fact  that  the  options  are  essentially  “negative  warrants”  and  the  price  dynamics  of  the
underlying stock include a material jump (the FDA panel recommendation).  Finally, we report on
the market’s reaction to Cephalon’s decision (section VI).  We conclude by suggesting lessons that
academics and managers might learn from Cephalon’s experience (section VII).
II.  The business environment and decisions facing Cephalon
1
Cephalon’s decision to buy options as a risk management strategy must be understood in
the  context  of  its  business.    This  section  briefly  describes  three  elements  of  the  business
environment, including (1) the importance of the imminent FDA panel decision to Cephalon; (2) the
decisions that Cephalon would face if the panel were to approve the drug; and (3) the terms of the
option proposal.
The imminent FDA decision: Founded in 1987, Cephalon, Inc. is a biotechnology firm that
focuses on treatments for neurological disorders.  In spring 1997, while the company had neither
FDA-approved drugs nor commercial sales, it anticipated imminent FDA review and subsequent
commercialization  of  its  first  drug,  Myotrophin,  a  treatment  for  Amytrophic  Lateral  Sclerosis
(ALS).  ALS, or Lou Gehrig’s disease, is a fatal neurodegenerative disorder characterized by the
deterioration of sensory and motor nerves. The disease’s cause is unknown and there is no known
                                                                
1 For more details, see the Harvard Business School case study by Tufano, Mullarkey and Verter, “Cephalon,
Inc.” (298-116).4
cure.  Analysts  estimate  that  ALS  afflicts  approximately  75,000  people  worldwide  and  that  the
worldwide market for treatments could generate revenues of $500 million annually.
2
Cephalon  developed  Myotrophin  in  partnership  with  Chiron  Corporation,  a  California-
based  biotechnology  firm,  at  a  cost  reported  to  be  approximately  $180  million.
3  Preliminary
scientific  studies  suggested  the  drug  had  potential  to  slow  the  onset  of  the  physical  decline
accompanying  ALS.  However,  before  it  could  sell  Myotrophin  commercially,  Cephalon  was
required to conduct a series of company-sponsored clinical tests and pass formal FDA regulatory
reviews.
4  Cephalon was nearing the end of this series of steps in 1997.  In 1995, it had released the
results of its first combined Phase II/III clinical trial, the “North American trial.”  The trial showed
statistically significant results indicating that Myotrophin slowed the progression of ALS and that
side effects were minor. Later that year, the company announced the results of a second trial, the
“European trial.”  The results of this trial were less compelling than those of the North American
study.  On the basis of these two studies, the company filed an application to expand patient access
to the drug prior to FDA approval.
On  February  11,  1997,  Cephalon  submitted  a  New  Drug  Application  (NDA)  for
Myotrophin.  An advisory panel meeting was scheduled for May 8, 1997.  Most observers felt the
panel’s approval was highly likely, with two analysts stating that the probability of approval was as
high as 70%.
5   Others privately expressed the approval probability at 80% or better.
If approved, Myotrophin would be an important source of revenue for Cephalon.  Equity
analysts’ projections of Myotrophin annual sales ranged from $30 million in 1997 to over $400
                                                                
2 See Lonergan, Stone, and Reed (February 20, 1997) and Malloy ( March 20, 1997).  The market potential for
addressing the broader class of medical disorders was estimated at over $3 billion.
3 Cephalon conducted the majority of the preliminary research and clinical testing, and Chiron would be
responsible for manufacturing Myotrophin, were the drug be approved.  Development costs were split evenly
between the companies, and production costs and commercial sales would be divided evenly as well.
Cephalon reported to us that its partnership with Chiron had no material impact on Cephalon’s financing
choices or on the decision to purchase the options.
4 See Shane (1995) and Cephalon, Inc.’s  December 1996 10-K filing for more detail on the FDA approval
process.
5 See Wilson and Schmidt (May 7, 1997) and Bishop (1997).5
million in 1999.  Analysts predicted that Cephalon’s stock (which was trading for about $20 in early
April 1997) would be worth $30-$40 per share if Myotrophin were approved, but if disapproved,
only $10-$15 per share. The approval would not generate immediate cash flow for Cephalon, as
development would take a few years.
Cephalon’s decisions if Myotrophin was approved:  While  the  approval  of  Myotrophin
would be good news to Cephalon, it would present management with a series of immediate financial
decisions.  Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of decisions.  First, management had to decide whether
to  buy  back  the  rights  to  Myotrophin.    As  is  common  in  this  industry,  to  fund  the  drug’s
development, Cephalon raised $38.7 million in August 1992 from Cephalon Clinical Partners, L.P.
(CCP), a research and development limited partnership sold by PaineWebber.
6    The  partnership
owned the exclusive license for the drug, but it granted Cephalon an interim license to manufacture
and market the drug in the U.S., Canada and Europe.  For this license, Cephalon would owe CCP a
Milestone  Payment  payable  when  the  drug  received  regulatory  approval.    Unless  Cephalon
subsequently bought back the rights to the drug, it would lose the future expected cash flows from
the sales of Myotrophin after this interim period.
Second, the managers had to decide how to buy back the rights to drug, if it was approved.
Under the limited partnership agreement, Cephalon had the right, but not the obligation, to buy back
the rights to the drug by making a contractual Purchase Option Payment of about $40 million two
years after the first commercial sale and by paying royalties to the CCP partners for another eleven
years. Cephalon would also need to pay the $16 million Milestone Payment under this arrangement.
Instead of exercising this contractual purchase option, Cephalon could tender for the CCP interests
directly,  which  managers  estimated  might  cost  the  firm  $125  million  in  cash,  including  the
Milestone Payment.  As we discuss later, Cephalon could make these payments in either cash or
                                                                
6 For a discussion of this means of financing R&D, see Beatty, Berger, and Magliolo (1995).6
Cephalon stock.  In addition to the needs to buy back the drug, the firm might require $20 million or
more to complete development of the drug.
Third, if Cephalon sought to buy back the interests with cash (especially in a tender), it
would need to identify  sources and timing of additional funds. Managers felt fairly confident that
they could raise $80 to $100 million through security offerings in the few years after the FDA
decision, but felt that it would be difficult to raise any additional funds. It was this incremental
funding need that the option proposal was designed to meet.
The option proposal: Because Cephalon needed money if the panel approved the drug, the
firm needed what Kevin Buchi, the firm’s CFO, called a “backwards insurance policy”; i.e., one that
paid  off  if  things  went  well,  not  poorly.  As  the  company  discussed  financing  with  various
investment banks at the beginning of 1997, bankers at SBC Warburg (SBC) proposed an innovative
financial strategy that offered this insurance. They suggested that Cephalon buy call options on its
own stock, so it would benefit from a share price increase that would likely follow FDA approval of
Myotrophin.  While companies increasingly were transacting in put options on their own stock to
enhance share repurchases, the call proposal was quite rare in the corporate sector.
7
Under the transaction, Cephalon would purchase 2.5 million capped call options from SBC
Warburg, in exchange for 490,000 shares of Cephalon common stock. The final terms of the options
were set on their date of issue, May 7, the day before the FDA panel meeting.
 8 The options were
European-style with an expiration date of October 31, 1997.  The strike price for the calls was set at
$21.50 per share and the cap at $39.50 per share, so that Cephalon’s payoff per share was limited to
                                                                
7 Derivative-based stock-buybacks  are discussed in Innes, Blanton, Nomo-Ongolo, and Sieden (1997) and
Browning and Lucchetti (1997).  Prior to Cephalon, a few firms had bought calls on their own stock.  For
example, it has been reported that Cadence Systems bought calls on its stock (and wrote puts) as part of its
repurchase strategy (see Barr (1997)).
8 Cephalon management intended to execute the option purchase in April 1997, but its registration of a
convertible issue delayed the filing of the option deal until May 7, 1997, one day before the FDA advisory
panel meeting.7
$18.
9  In  order  to  decide  whether  to  accept  the  SBC  proposal,  Cephalon’s  managers  needed  to
consider the appropriateness of the transaction as part of their risk management program, and it is
this decision that the remainder of this paper analyzes.
III.  The Theory of Cash-Flow Hedging
In press statements and SEC filings, Cephalon’s executives explained their motivation for
the  call  option  transaction.    Kevin  Buchi,  Cephalon’s  CFO,  describes  the  transaction  most
succinctly: “It [the call option position] provides us with cash when we need it the most.”
10  This
argument for the option transaction is a near-textbook application of the theory of cash-flow hedging
as recently discussed by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (FSS 1993, 1994).
11  They argue that “the role
of risk management is to ensure that a company has the cash available to make value-enhancing
investments.” Rather than simply reducing the variability of a firm’s earnings or cash flows, the
cash-flow hedging theory may lead a firm to increase these volatilities.  In particular, it has the firm
engineer its operating cash flows to match the investment opportunities that it faces.  If the firm’s
best investment opportunities are highly variable, then it is appropriate to have variable operating
cash  flows.    In  Cephalon’s  case,  where  investment  opportunities  arise  in  good  times,  it  can  be
                                                                
9 The options were Asian-style in that the final stock price used in the calculations was the average of
Cephalon’s NASDAQ share price, observed three times each day (at 10:00 am, 12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.,
EST) over the twenty trading days preceding and including October 31.  At maturity, Cephalon could either
receive cash from SBC if the options were in the money or it could pay the exercise price and receive shares.
Cephalon anticipated using cash settlement if the options were in-the-money.  The stock-settlement clause
permitted Cephalon to account for the option gains as part of comprehensive income and not on the income
statement.  The CFO explained that this clause did not cost Cephalon in terms of effective premium paid, but
gave the firm a more attractive accounting treatment.
10 Quoted in Ward (1997).
11 The general notion that capital market imperfections could lead to optimal risk management had been
advanced earlier in a number of papers including Stulz (1990) and Lessard (1990).  There are a number of
theories of risk management, whereby corporate risk management is the outcome of non-linear tax schedules,
costs of financial distress, managerial risk aversion, or imperfect information. For discussions of these
alternative explanations of risk management, see Stulz (1984, 1990, 1996), Smith and Stulz (1985), or
DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), among others.8
optimal for the risk management program to strengthen already-strong cash flows in these periods.
Under  the  theory,  as  articulated  by  FSS,  firms  face  risky  positive-NPV  investment
opportunities.  A key assumption of the model is that firms incur deadweight costs when raising
external finance, and this cost is increasing in the amount raised.  These deadweight costs justify
hedging  because  they  lead  firms  to  underinvest  relative  to  the  first-best  solution,  linking  their
investment  activities  to  their  internally-available  cash  flow.
12    Theory  does  not  suggest  how  to
measure these deadweight costs.
Mapping this framework to Cephalon’s case is straightforward, although then determining
whether the company’s transaction is justified on risk management grounds is not, as we discuss
subsequently. The exogenous risk factor is the FDA approval, an idiosyncratic risk. This risk factor
may affect operating cash flows, the optimal investment levels, or the costs of external financing.
For cash flow hedging of this risk to be justified, the theory suggests that managers need to ascertain
the following:
1.  Investment attractiveness: In the event that Myotrophin is approved, the firm will have a
valuable investment opportunity in buying back the rights to the drug .
2.  Investment needs and internal resources: Cephalon’s internal cash flow is insufficient to
meet these needs.
3.  Costs of external finance: High (and convex) costs of external financing make financing this
need externally sub-optimal, and could lead to a second-best investment decision.  One
must explicitly consider the effect of the risk factor (the FDA approval) on the cost of
financing.
4. Appropriateness of risk management program:  The option will provide the proper payoff
when the firm needs the cash.  Specifically, if the FDA approves Myotrophin, the firm’s
stock will rise and the option will pay off.  While theory assumes that risk management is
costless (with respect to deadweight costs), if this were not the case, we would need to
determine that the option is a cost-effective way of raising the needed funds.
                                                                
12 Some empirical evidence supports this general proposition.  For example, see Fazarri, Hubbard and
Peterson (1988).  Lamont (1997) also finds that investment is sensitive to cash flow, but he suggests that a
decrease in cash flow may lead to more efficient investment if diversified firms overinvest when cash flow is
high.9
IV.   Applying the cash-flow hedging arguments in practice
In this section, we review the four contentions introduced in the prior section.  Our goal is
to specify the data and analyses required to justify the option purchase decision under the theory of
cash-flow hedging.
Contention  1:  If  the  FDA  approves  Myotrophin,  Cephalon  will  have  an  attractive
investment opportunity—buying back the rights to the drug.  In applying the cash-flow hedging
argument,  the  first  step  is  show  that  the  repurchase  of  the  rights  to  Myotrophin  enhances
shareholder  value.  If  not,  risk  management  could  be  misused  to  destroy  shareholder  value  by
eliminating valuable capital markets discipline (Tufano (1998)).
In Table 1,  we  analyze  the  financial  implications  of  the  buyback,  using  a  composite  of
analysts’  estimates  of  Myotrophin  sales  and  profits  and  a  discounted  cash  flow  approach.  The
internal rate of return of buying back the approved drug ranges from 81% to 266%, depending on
whether Cephalon uses a tender offer or the purchase option to buy back the rights.  Either of these
is well above the 25% hurdle rate used by equity analysts studying Cephalon. The buyback has an
NPV of $340 to $408 million (even excluding a terminal value) and is an attractive investment,
regardless of the method of purchase.
13
Cephalon could either buy back the rights through a tender offer or through the contractual
purchase option. Given the  pro forma projections, the two offers have equal value using a 40%
discount  rate  (or  at  a  25%  discount  rate,  if  revenues  are  half  as  large  as  shown).
14  This  rough
comparability makes economic sense: were Cephalon to offer the limited partners an inferior tender
                                                                
13 With a zero growth rate and a 25% discount rate, valuing the terminal value as a perpetuity might add $25
million to the NPV calculation. This analysis ignores any follow-on business opportunities, which would be
best modeled using a real options approach.
14 The $125 million value for the tender offer was apparently determined through negotiations with
representatives of the limited partners, and was believed to be an good estimate of the tender.  These analyses
assume that the purchase price is paid in cash, although Cephalon had the right to pay the purchase option
price in stock.  This alternative is discussed later.  Tax implications of the buyback are not taken into account
in the analysis.10
offer, they would reject it, but Cephalon would not have a strong incentive to offer a much better
deal than they could obtain through the contractual purchase option contract terms.
15
Contention 2: Cephalon’s internal cash flow is inadequate to fund this investment.  If
Cephalon’s internal cash flow were sufficient to fund the valuable investment opportunity, there
would be no reason to devise a complicated cash-flow hedging scheme.
16  Cephalon’s managers
justified the option purchase on the argument that in the event of FDA approval, the firm’s internal
cash flow would be insufficient to fund on-going business activities as well as repurchase the rights
to Myotrophin.
 17   To the contrary, our analysis suggests that Cephalon probably could have funded
a cash buyback without the proposed hedging strategy, and the cash-flow shortfall was the result of
the firm’s insistence on using one particular way to buy back the rights.
Because  Cephalon  does  not  provide  projections  of  its  future  needs,  we  use  analysts’
forecasts to estimate these needs.  Table 2 summarizes projections for future cash flow needs for
1997 through 1999, if Myotrophin was approved and if Cephalon bought the CCP interests with
cash,  either  through  a  tender  or  the  contractual  purchase  option.  Even  if  Myotrophin  had  been
approved, Cephalon would continue to experience negative operating and investment cash flows for
a few years, as sales would not ramp-up immediately.  Were it to buy out the partnership for $125
million in cash in 1997, the firm would face a total financing shortfall of about $200 million in that
year or $230 million over the next two years.  Were it to exercise the purchase option and make the
$40 million payment to CCP in 1999, it would face a shortfall of $85 million in 1997 and $129 over
the two-year period, roughly half of the shortfall a cash tender would create.
These figures must be evaluated in light of three factors: (a) the firm’s December 1996 cash
                                                                
15 The ex post attractiveness of the buyout to Cephalon does not necessarily indicate that the limited
partnership was mispriced ex ante, a topic that is beyond the scope of this paper.
16 In this section we discuss only cash-based investment alternatives.  We defer the discussion of the equity
alternatives to the next section.
17 See Cephalon’s May 5, 1997 8-K, p. 7.11
balances  of  $146  million,  (b)  its  goal  to  maintain  target  cash  balances  equal  to  a  few  years  of
operating expenses, and (c) its expectation that it could raise $100 million through a combination of
offerings similar to a privately-placed convertible offering that closed on May 7, 1997.  In view of
these constraints and resources, the firm could probably meet the near-term cash-flow requirements
of the purchase option alternative without resorting to the option purchase proposal. However, it
could not carry out the cash tender offer without almost completely depleting its cash balances by
the end of 1998.   Hence, if the firm were indifferent about the means of buying back the CCP
rights, the risk management problem would have been less severe.
Even though the contractual purchase option produces a more manageable cash flow strain
on  Cephalon  and  an  NPV  comparable  to  that  of  the  tender,  virtually  all  of  the  discussion  by
Cephalon and analysts focused on the cash tender offer as the means of buying back the Myotrophin
rights.    At  first,  we  suspected  that  this  preference  was  the  result  of  management’s  belief  that
Myotrophin  sales  might  far  exceed  even  the  projections  we  used,  or  due  to  tax  considerations.
Through discussions with company management, we discovered that the accounting treatment best
explained their preference.
If the firm were to make a cash tender for the limited partnership interests after the panel
approval but before the full FDA approval, it could expense the entire amount as purchased in-
process research and development, because the final outcome would be deemed to be uncertain.
This would give rise to large expense for both accounting and tax purposes in the current year—in
which it would have negative earnings anyway—but lower expenses and higher earnings in future
years when it would be making positive earnings.
18
However, if the firm were to exercise the purchase option instead of the tender, it would
buy back the rights to Myotrophin  after the final FDA approval.  Under GAAP, Cephalon would
                                                                
18 The cash tender would also generate an immediate net operating loss (NOL) that the firm could use as
Myotrophin earnings materialized, but given that the firm already had $75 million in NOLs and would
generate them for a few more years, accelerating them would add little practical value.12
need to capitalize the purchased research and development for Myotrophin and expense it over the
life of the drug.
19  This would spread out the buyback expense for both accounting and tax reporting
and lead to lower earnings over the drug’s life.  Thus, Cephalon could either take a big loss in the
current year, or spread the cost of the buyback over the next decade.
Research  has  shown  that  firms  engage  in  “big  baths”  typically  around  management
turnover,  or  in  instances  where  executive  compensation  plans  are  keyed  to  earnings  (Healey
(1985)). Neither of these circumstances seem at play in this case; management had not recently
changed,  nor  were  their  earnings-based  compensation  programs  for  top  managers.  Rather,  the
rationale flows from the strongly held management belief that the immediate recognition of losses
while the firm was still in the development phase would lead to higher ultimate market value than
would  the  depression  of  accounting  earnings  over  the  life  of  Myotrophin.    Thus  management’s
belief about the way in which analysts relate earnings to firm value is central to its risk management
choice. As explained to us, “It is interesting that all the models used by analysts to value [Cephalon]
stock take a discounted P/E approach.  This transaction (the tender offer) materially affects this
form of valuation.”
While there is general academic evidence that accounting choices affect valuation,
20 i t  i s
harder  to  judge  whether  Cephalon  managers’  specific  accounting  concerns  are  relevant.  At  this
point, the value—and limitof clinical research becomes apparent.  Its value is to show the role
that this belief plays in explaining the firm’s risk management choices and to highlight this topic as
an important one for future theoretical and empirical research.  The limitation of clinical research is
that it cannot help us to understand whether management’s proposition is correct.
Apart from these accounting considerations, the analysis reminds us that a firm’s optimal
                                                                
19 A portion of the R&D for non-ALS uses of Myotrophin might be able to expensed even after the FDA
approval for the drug’s use in the treatment of ALS.  This accounting treatment was promulgated in GAAP
statements FAS-2 and FIN-4.
20 See, for example, Moses (1987), Ronen and Sadan (1975), Lang (1991), and Barth, Elliot and Finn (1995).13
cash balance, as well as its expected ability to raise financing in the future, interact to influence
firms’ risk management programs.
21  We were told that it is common practice in the biotechnology
industry for firms to carry large cash balances, in essence pre-funding themselves or providing a
form of risk management.
 22  Partly in jest, we were informed that, “No biotech firm ever went out
of business because they had too much cash.” Cephalon sought to keep cash balances on hand equal
to two to three years of projected spending because of the belief that markets can be uncertain, and
that their ability to raise cash could not be assured.  Opler et al. (1999) document that this type of
precautionary  motive  for  holding  cash  is  widespread,  with  the  mean  (median)  Compustat  firm
holding  cash  equal  to  about  two  (one)  years  of  capital  expenditures.  Thus,  a  risk  management
decision—especially one driven by cash-flow concerns—must be determined in conjunction with its
policy  regarding  target  cash  balances,  and  both  are  affected  by  expectations  of  future  funding
ability.
Contention  3:    Funding  this  need  externally  is  unattractive.    The  core  assumption
behind cash flow hedging is that external financing is unavailable or very costly.  If financing was
not costly or if the costs of financing were not convex, cash flow hedging would not make sense.
Also,  the  theory  contemplates  that  the  cost  of  financing  could  fluctuate  with  the  uncertain  risk
factor.  While one can accept the general contention that external financing is costly, to implement
the theory, we need to measure these costs, especially financing costs that relate to the key risk
factor—the FDA decision.
23   Our analysis suggests that external financing might not be so costly to
                                                                
21 Cash holding decisions by corporations are discussed in Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999).  A
desire to hold liquidity also forms the basis of Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1999) liquidity-based asset pricing
model.
22 Tufano (1996) finds an inverse relationship between cash balances and risk management activity in the gold
mining industry, although Opler et al. (1999) fail to demonstrate this relationship.
23 The fixed-scale of Cephalon’s investment introduces a complication that FSS specifically consider.  With a
fixed-scale investment, hedging is optimal only if this deadweight cost function is convex, so the formal
application of the model requires not only that Cephalon’s managers recognize the existence of deadweight
costs, but also that the first and second derivatives of these costs meet the conditions described above.14
Cephalon, especially if Myotrophin were approved, so as to justify its risk management choice.
Deadweight costs of external finance may arise from a variety of causes. Informational
asymmetries are thought to be determinants of the high cost of issuing equity and used to explain
the empirical regularity that equity issues tend to depress stock prices.
24  But how costly is external
financing and how do we measure these costs?  As a first step, we asked the firm’s CFO to identify
the costs of raising funds.  He suggested that these costs included underwriting fees, expenses,
underpricing and market impact, and estimated that the total costs of raising equity range between
16% and 20%, and slightly less for equity-linked debt or R&D limited partnerships.  Academic
readers of this paper have questioned how a manager would arrive at this estimate, but the question
itself reveals that neither managers nor academics have developed a standard approach to estimating
these costs.
Event study reactions to security offerings are sometimes used as evidence of the magnitude
of information asymmetries and the costs associated with these asymmetries.  For example, Froot et
al. (1993) cite the 3% drop in market value upon the announcement of equity issues in discussing
information asymmetries that make equity financing costly.
25  In Table 3, we examine the extent to
which  the  firm’s  announcements  of  previous  external  financings  have  affected  the  value  of  the
firm’s equity to crudely gauge the size of external financing costs. On average, Cephalon’s three
equity offerings depressed the market value of the firm about 6.0% each, for an average offering
dilution of nearly 30% of the amount raised.
26
However,  each  of  these  offerings  was  done  prior  to  the  FDA  decision,  arguably  when
information asymmetries and therefore costs of external financing were high. We suspect that the
informational  impact  of  a  post-FDA  financing  should  be  much  smaller,  and  perhaps  not  even
                                                                
24 See Froot et al. (1993), pp. 1633-1634 for a discussion. Myers and Majluf (1984) provide an early
discussion of the costs of external financing and their impact on firm investment decisions.
25 For a summary of these results, see Smith (1987).
26 In contrast, the announcement of the private placement of a convertible debt issue was greeted with a
positive abnormal return of 8.1% and substantial positive offering dilution.15
negative.  The firm’s funding need would be well-known, given its pre-announced need for funds.
It would follow the revelation of validated and material information, and under these circumstances
informational asymmetries and costs of external financing should decline.  Korajczyk, Lucas and
McDonald (1991) find that the decline stocks typically experience after an announcement of a new
issue  is  smallest  when  credible  information  has  just  been  released,  as  this  is  when  information
asymmetries are the lowest.  Consequently, if Cephalon were to raise equity right after the release of
verified, credible “good news,” the FDA decision, we might expect a small signaling penalty, if any
at all.
To begin to explore this hypothesis, we examined Shane’s (1995) sample of biotechnology
firms  whose  therapeutic  products  were  reviewed  by  the  FDA  in  the  period  1988-1994.    She
identifies 37 products that were approved and 10 that were rejected in this period.  We track the
firms to see whether they issue equity within a year of the FDA decision.  The sample is quite small,
with only seven equity issues following approvals (7/37 or 19%).  The mean abnormal return for the
seven  post-approval  equity  issues  is  +0.14%,  rather  than  the  standard  –3%  loss  we  normally
associate with equity issues.  One interpretation of this result is that informational asymmetries are
reduced for these firms with validated good-news, and thus, the deadweight costs of financing (or
unexpected costs of raising funds) are reduced.
27  This suggestive evidence reminds us that the costs
of financing are not only a function of the amount of funds raised, but also of the degree to which
informational  asymmetries  exist.    To  the  extent  that  the  FDA  decision  resolves  informational
asymmetries, the costs of post-FDA financing might not be very large, which makes it harder to
justify the transaction under the theory of cash flow hedging. Moreover, a positive FDA decision
also signals that the firm has valuable investment opportunities, and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996)
                                                                
27 An alternative explanation is that the sample suffers from survivorship bias. We only measure the abnormal
returns of the firms that we observed to issue equity. There very well may have been firms which tried to issue
equity but could not because the cost would have been prohibitively high. These firms and costs should also
be included in our calculation, but since we do not observe them, we cannot.16
find that firms with good investment prospects suffer less of a penalty from issuing equity than do
firms  that  do  not  have  valuable  investment  opportunities.    Considering  Cephalon’s  attractive
investment  opportunity  with  Myotrophin  (Contention  1),  the  firm’s  post-FDA  approval  cost  of
external finance might well be low.
Proving that the firm would face high costs of external financing is additionally challenging
because of the firm’s ability to put shares to the holders of CCP at a contractually-agreed upon
discount. Under the terms of the contractual purchase option, Cephalon could pay both the $16
million Milestone Payment and the $40 million Purchase Option Payment in stock, valued at 95%
of the average market value over the previous few weeks. This 5% discount is much smaller than
the unconditional 15-20% haircut associated with a full equity offering. Furthermore, were it to
choose the tender offer, Cephalon could have offered the CCP partners shares in the firm rather than
cash, perhaps at roughly the same 5% discount. Using the analysts' projections that the firm’s stock
might be $35 conditional on FDA approval, the firm would need to issue approximately 2% and 5%
of  the  outstanding  shares  to  meet  the  Milestone  and  Purchase  Option  Payments,  which  reflect,
respectively, one to two days trading volume.
28   Were it to pay $125 million in stock to tender for
the CCP interests at a 5% discount, this would be about 3.6 million shares, or about 15% of the
outstanding shares.
Using equity to tender or execute the Purchase Option would not have allowed Cephalon to
eliminate informational costs of external finance.  An equity payment is like a new share issue, so
one might expect an equity-based purchase to lead to a share price drop, as often occurs in seasoned
equity offerings.
29  However, as argued earlier, in Cephalon’s case, the issuance of shares to CCP
holders  would  occur  after  good  information  had  been  revealed,  and  the  motivation  for  the
                                                                
28 Average daily trading volume in Cephalon from January 1, 1996 to May 7, 1997 was 762,200 shares,
calculated from data from Reuters.   As NASD double-counts transactions, were the shares delivered to the
CCP immediately resold by them, this would equal roughly about 2 to 4 days of average sales.
29 See, for example, Asquith and Mullins (1986).17
transaction would have been transparent, so the penalty for equity issuance might not be severe.
  Management considered, but rejected, the idea of using shares in conjunction with either the
tender offer or the contractual purchase option. In explaining this decision, firm executives noted
their  concerns  that  if  CCP  holders  received  shares,  they  might  immediately  sell  them,  creating
negative  price  pressure  on  Cephalon  stock.
30    The  CCP  units  originally  had  been  sold  by
PaineWebber,  but  the  brokerage  firm’s  analysts  did  not  cover  Cephalon  or  make  a  market  in
Cephalon shares.  Management feared that brokers would not strongly encourage their clients who
purchased the CCP units to retain the Cephalon shares, and thus there would be massive sales of the
stock.
However, existing empirical evidence calls into question whether these volumes of shares,
even if immediately sold, would have a material and permanent effect on Cephalon’s stock price.
Existing work has focused on block trades and secondary offerings, and generally found evidence of
both temporary and persistent price pressure.
31  However, in this instance, one can imagine that not
all of the CCP partners would choose to sell, the sales might be spread out over time, and the sales
would not be perceived as providing new information about the firm. Cephalon might also be able
to modify the terms of the offer to offset the impact. It could deliver the shares over a longer time
window rather than all at once, hold information sessions for the limited partners to encourage them
to hold their shares, or pre-arrange for a secondary offering by the selling partners.
Even if all of the former CCP partners sold their newly acquired Cephalon shares at once, it
is  questionable  whether  the  price  of  the  stock  would  be  affected  permanently.    Market
microstructure research on the relationship between volume and stock price suggests that volume is
                                                                
30 A secondary consideration for opposing a tender offer with shares is the extra regulatory delay, uncertainty
and expense that this step would require.  If Cephalon tendered for the shares with stock, it would have
needed to file an S-4, which would slow down the transaction (and possibly preclude Cephalon from enjoying
the attractive accounting treatment of buying back the pre-FDA-decision R&D).  As a result, if Cephalon
sought to tender for the shares, managers felt that it would be easier and simpler to do so with cash.
31 In early work Scholes (1972) finds that secondary distributions by individuals (excluding corporate officers)
have a small impact on share prices (0.7%) over the ten days subsequent to the secondary offering.18
not always associated with a fall in the share price, and when it is, the price often rebounds.  He and
Wang (1995) argue that high volume generated by exogenous information is associated with large
price changes, but high volume generated by existing information is not.  Again, it is not clear that
any new information would be revealed by CCP investors flipping Cephalon stock, so there might
not necessarily be a drop in the price of Cephalon stock.  In Campbell, Grossman, and Wang’s
(1993) model sales by "liquidity" or "noninformed" traders – in this case, the CCP investors – do
generate pressure that leads to price drops.  However, the model predicts that there will be price
increases  on  subsequent  days,  because  rational  investors  willing  to  accommodate  the  selling
pressure demand a reward in terms of a lower stock price (the initial drop) and a higher expected
return (the subsequent increase).  This prediction is confirmed empirically by Conrad, Hameed, and
Niden  (1994),  who  find  that  high  transaction  securities  experience  price  reversals.    Applied  to
Cephalon,  this  research  suggests  that  while  the  price  might  fall  initially  if  the  CCP  investors
unloaded their positions en masse, the fall would likely not be sustained.
An alternate explanation for the managers’ reluctance to use equity in a tender or for the
Purchase Option is that issuing new equity would have reduced the managers’ control over the firm
by  diluting  their  ownership.    Considering  the  relatively  meager  ownership  stake  held  by  top
management, however, this seems unlikely.  As of March 1997, the eleven executive officers and
directors held 363,935 shares and exerciseable options on another 762,501 shares.  On a base of
24.6 million shares outstanding, these combined holdings amount to about 4.6 percent of the total
shares.  As noted earlier, under the assumption that Cephalon stock would reach $35 upon FDA
approval, an equity-based Purchase Option deal would have diluted the outstanding stock by five
percent.  An equity tender offer would have diluted the outstanding equity by approximately 15
percent.      Consequently,  these  dilutions  would  have  reduced  management  ownership  from  4.6
percent to 4.3 percent or 3.9 percent, depending on the purchase method.  These are fairly small
absolute changes in control.19
Finally, while we have argued that post-FDA approval external financing costs might not be
inordinately high, we can also ask whether Cephalon’s investment decision would be distorted if the
external financing costs  were high.  We suspect not. The return from repurchasing the rights to
Myotrophin is perhaps as high as 81% or 266%, from  Table 1.  Even if Cephalon had to raise the
entire amount of the tender offer in new equity and suffer a 20% deadweight loss, the value in
repurchasing Myotrophin is so high that the firm would not change its investment decision. When a
firm’s  investment  decisions  are  not  distorted  by  the  presence  of  costly  external  finance,  risk
management does not create value.
In total, we have reservations about whether the costs of external financing are sufficiently
high to motivate Cephalon to adopt the type of risk management used here.
An  aside:  How  should  academics  and  managers  measure  deadweight  costs  of
financing?    Event  study  reactions  are  only  crude  metrics  of  the  cost  of  external  financing.
Abnormal returns reflect the capitalization of the  unexpected impact of the offering, so expected
costs of financing are not included.  Also, while equity issues may depress stock prices due to the
information revealed, this effect is irrelevant if the information would have been revealed anyway.
Finally, event studies can only measure the costs of financings that firms executed; presumably the
costs of the deals never done were higher.
As part of our study, we asked practitioners how they conceived of the costs of external
financing.  Managers, equity analysts and bankers framed their analysis of the costs of external
funding with respect to: (a) sheer unavailability of funds; (b) total costs of obtaining funds; and (c)
costs of funds with respect to dilution.  In essence, they focused on the access and total cost of
financing  as  a  critical  risk  factor.    Firms  like  Cephalon  raise  money  in  capital  markets  whose20
interest in buying shares can wax and wane without warning.
32  Lerner and Merges’ (1998) work
documents this pattern.  They track the amount of external funds raised by firms in the biotech
industry  from  1978  through  1985.  In  the  18  years  that  they  observe,  there  were  no  issues  of
seasoned equity offerings, private placements, or any debt raised in five, eight, and eleven of the
years, respectively.  Managers note that during these periods financing is either simply unavailable
or so expensive that they prefer not to raise funds.   For managers, the cost or risk of raising external
financing is like a Poisson process: in each period there is a material probability that external funds
will simply become unavailable.  This view is consistent with formal models of credit rationing,
such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
On a related point, while academics focus on  firm-specific deadweight costs of financing,
managers, analysts and bankers are equally concerned with total costs of funds.  They consider the
expected price-earnings multiples or market-to-book multiples at which they would be able to sell
equity or the interest rate at which they could raise debt, rather than the wedge between the prices
offered at the time and the “fair” price of their particular security.   Academic evidence on “hot
markets” suggests that there are times when funding becomes more or less expensive for all firms.
33
Most academic analysis would ignore these fluctuations, considering that all of these market prices
are fair and thus only deviations from the fair prices (deadweight costs) are relevant.  However, to
the extent that these macro-cycles represent deviations from long-run “fair” prices, as managers
assert, risk management programs should consider them.
Finally, managers and bankers advised us that costs of external equity financing must be
measured with respect to equity dilution; that is, the fraction of the firm’s equity that Cephalon
                                                                
32 This risk is noted in the Cephalon’s filings: “There can be no assurance that (external) funding will be
available at all or on terms acceptable to the Company.  If adequate funds are not available, the Company may
be required to significantly curtail one or more of its research or development programs or obtain funds
through arrangements with existing or future collaborative partners or others that may require the Company to
relinquish rights to certain of its technologies, product candidates or products.” Cephalon Form 8-K (May 5,
1997), page 8.
33 For a recent discussion of this phenomenon, see Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996).21
would need to give away under different circumstances, and that the goal should be to raise funds
with minimal dilution of existing shareholders. This analysis would require managers to combine
both deadweight and absolute financing costs to calculate this dilution effect.
Our discussions with managers suggest that while the costs of external financing are central
to risk management theory, neither academics nor managers have made great progress in measuring
them.  Furthermore, managers seem to be attuned to a richer set of costs that have not been fully
considered in theoretical work.
Contention 4: The proposed call options deliver cash when Cephalon needs it most.
Under a cash-flow hedging scheme, risk management is valuable because it can deliver cash when it
is most useful to the firm.  In this instance, the options should deliver cash when the firm needs it to
buy out CCP, assuming cash payments.  The buyout would occur if the FDA panel were to approve
the drug, and the contention is that the firm’s stock would rise—and the options would pay off—in
precisely this situation.
Managers are typically barred from making predictions of the future prices of their firm’s
common stock, so there are no explicit estimates by Cephalon of its possible stock price, were the
panel  to  approve  Myotrophin.    However,  Wall  Street  analysts  writing  in  the  spring  of  1997
estimated the impact of FDA approval of Myotrophin on the value of Cephalon’s shares, as shown
in Table 4.  Their analysis confirms the intuition that the panel’s approval of the drug would have a
substantial impact on the market value of the Cephalon shares and options, with shares rising to a
value of  $30-40 if approved, and falling to $20 or less if not approved. If Cephalon stock were to
rise to $30 after approval, the options would deliver $21.25 million to the firm, and at $40 per share22
they would pay off $45 million.
34
While the contention that the options would pay off when Cephalon most needed the cash
seems reasonable, there could be instances in which the payoffs from the option would deviate from
those sought by Cephalon.  Were the panel to delay its meeting beyond the six-month exercise
window, the options might expire worthless, and the firm’s fund imbalance would not be addressed.
Alternatively, if the stock market (or the technology sector) suffered a large downward “correction,”
the payoff could be reduced independent of the FDA’s approval.  A different structure could have
indexed the payoff to the return on a broad equity index.
V. Valuing the Cephalon options
To complete our analysis, we need to make one final determination: that the options are a
cost-effective  solution  for  Cephalon.  The  executives  at  Cephalon  recognized  that  they  had
alternative  ways  to  meet  their  incremental  funding  need,  but  judged  the  option  plan  the  most
efficient way to fund these requirements.  In particular, the firm’s CFO has been quoted as saying,
“We view the transaction as a good cost-benefit trade-off.”
35
Models like FSS posit deadweight costs of external financing, but are silent on whether
there are deadweight costs associated with risk management products.  We find that using equity
derivatives as risk management vehicles might generate material deadweight costs.  Cephalon’s
counterparty,  SBC  Warburg,  faced  the  same  kind  of  informational  asymmetries  that  other
purchasers of the firm’s stock would encounter, and as a result the cost of this transaction could
easily rival those of more traditional financing alternatives. Accordingly, we examine whether the
                                                                
34 Previous academic research and analyst predictions support the contention that the FDA panel’s decision
would have a substantial impact on the firm’s stock price, and thereby on the options’ value.  Shane (1995)
studied the impact of the FDA approval process on the market values of biotechnology firms in the period
1981 through 1994.  She finds that FDA panel and full approvals lead to a mean three-day abnormal return of
1.2% and 4.5%, respectively, while disapprovals by a panel or the full FDA are associated with losses of
29.7% and 28.5%, respectively. Equity analysts’ estimates seem to indicate a much stronger increase in value
following FDA approval than this prior research would suggest.
35Quoted in Meuchner (1997).23
swap of 490,000 shares for the 2,500,000 sets of capped calls was a costly exchange for Cephalon,
and compare these costs to those of external financing.
Cephalon would pay no commissions or other explicit transaction costs to purchase the
options, so the direct “cost” of the exchange is represented by the difference between the value of
the shares delivered and the options received.  The indirect cost of the transaction would be its
impact on the market value of the firm, which is hard to estimate given that no other firm had ever
attempted a transaction of this sort.  Our analysis below will focus on the direct deadweight costs of
the option purchase.
On the day the exchange was effected, the market value of the shares was $20, so for
490,000  shares,  Cephalon  delivered  securities  worth  $9.8  million  dollars.    In  turn,  it  received
2,500,000 sets of capped calls. A first-pass analysis might use the standard Black-Scholes (1973)
model to value these call spreads.  Given their maturity of six months, current interest rates of 5.5%,
and the volatility of 75% (which management was using at the time),
36 each pair of call spreads
would be worth $3.05 each, for an aggregate value of $7.625 million.  Thus, at first glance, it would
appear that the trade cost Cephalon $2.175 million, the difference between the value of the shares it
delivered and the options it received.
However, this analysis fails to capture many important details of the transaction.  First, the
options’ payoff at maturity is determined by the spread between the exercise price and the stock’s
average price over the 20 days prior to exercise, with three readings taken a day, so the options have
an Asian feature that the Black-Scholes model is not built to handle.  This averaging feature would
tend to reduce the value of the options.  Second, these options are being bought by a firm on its own
                                                                
36 The implied volatilites for traded seven-month options were 69% to 76%, but for one month options were
123% to 145%, suggesting that a great deal of uncertainty would be resolved by the FDA announcement.24
stock, so in effect they are negative warrants due to the negative dilution effect.
37  This anti-dilution
would tend to increase the value of the position acquired by Cephalon.  Third, and most importantly,
Cephalon faces a large stock price jump when the FDA advisory panel recommendation is issued,
one day after the option contract is signed.  This large jump effectively increases the volatility of the
underlying stock and increases the option value. It also means that the true distribution of returns is
bimodal.  Fourth, from January 1996 to May of 1997, the skewness of Cephalon’s daily log stock
returns is -1.13 (0.26), while the kurtosis is 15.54 (.13). These values are significantly different from
those expected for a normal distribution.
38 Ignoring the fact that the implied volatility surface (a
graph that combines the volatility smile and term structure of volatilities) for Cephalon’s options is
not  flat  would  lead  to  biased  and  inconsistent  parameter  estimates  for  the  underlying  valuation
model, throwing into some question the robustness of the conclusions we draw as to whether the
options are a cost-effective financing vehicle for Cephalon. Therefore, a model accounting for non-
normality in log returns is in order.
While  the  first  three  non-standard  features  can  be  captured  within  a  Black-Scholes
framework with some adjustments, the non-normality of log returns cannot. To account for this
feature, we model the stock price process using a variant of the GJR-GARCH process developed in
Glosten,  Jagannathan,  &  Runkle  (1993).  The  risk-neutral  version  of  this  process  (derived  in  an
Appendix that is available from the authors) is given by
                                                                
37 The dilution effect occurs whether Cephalon elects to receive payment in stock or cash. This is because its
underlying shares appreciate in value as the options become more in the money (because the shareholders
effectively “own” the options), before any payment is received. This increase in the value of the options in
turn translates to an increase in share, which again raises the value of the underlying shares, and so on. In
addition, as the options become more in the money, the capital structure of the firm changes as well, since the
equity is becoming more valuable. This change in capital structure also affects the valuation of the option
because it changes the stock’s volatility. Finally, these effects occur regardless of whether the terminal payoff
of the option is in cash or stock. We will use a first-order approximation to model these effects by simply
using a standard dilution adjustment to the option price. A more sophisticated model would consider the limit
of these feedback processes. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these subtleties, and are grateful
to Bob Merton for a helpful discussion on these points.
38 A more formal goodness-of-fit test for normality can be conducted using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-
statistic. This statistic yields a value of .49 for the log stock returns, while the 1% critical value for the test is
.087. Thus, the test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of normality in the log returns.25
log St+1/St = r + ½σt
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where S t represents the stock price, r denotes the interest rate (assumed constant),  σt denotes the
stock price volatility, and εt represents a standard Normal random variable.  β0,  β1,  β2, and  β3 are
constant coefficients. The function  φt  represents  the  market  price  of  risk  and  is  given  by  the
expression
φt = [α0 + (α1 + ½)σt
2 – r]/σt
where α0 and  α1  are  constants  that  appear  in  the  expected  return  of  the  objective  stock  price
process.
39
By allowing the stock price volatility to fluctuate, we make a first-cut effort at capturing the
non-flat volatility surface implied by Cephalon’s currently traded options. The time variation of
volatility in the GARCH model automatically generates a volatility smile. The mean reversion of
volatility and the asymmetric impact that price shocks have on volatility in the GJR version of the
GARCH  model  allow  for  a  term  structure  of  volatilities  and  asymmetry  in  the  volatility  smile,
respectively. As is shown later, these features are sufficient to not allow for rejection of normality in
the residuals of the estimated model.
The jump term 1{t=t*} on the stock price reflects the large impact that the FDA committee's
recommendation will have on the stock price. The jump term has a value of 0, except at time t=t*
when the FDA announcement is made. At time t=t*, the Bernoulli random variable, J, determines
the magnitude of the jump. Thus, with probability p, the FDA announcement causes an upward
jump in the stock price, while with probability 1-p, it causes a downward jump.
40 In addition, the
jump term 1 {t>t*} on the volatility process indicates that the FDA announcement also changes the
                                                                
39 Due to the non-Markov nature of the GARCH process, the expected return of the stock enters into the risk-
neutral process, and therefore into option prices, unlike with the Black-Scholes/Merton pricing formula.
40 Note that these are risk-neutral quantities only and should not be interpreted as the actual parameters
governing the jump process.26
unconditional mean of the stock's volatility process. This jump term takes on a value of 0 until time
t=t*, at which point it takes on a value of 1 and stays at that value thereafter. The jump magnitude, j,
is  also  a  Bernoulli  random  variable  and  is  determined  at  time  t=t*  and  remains  at  this  value
thereafter. Thus, j serves to alter the unconditional mean of Cephalon's stock variance to one of two
values, depending on the direction of the FDA announcement.
We estimate all of the parameters of the model except the jump terms using time series
stock price data for Cephalon ranging from January 1996 to May 1997. Parameter estimates are
provided in  Table 5 . Several of the volatility parameters are found to be statistically significant,
indicating  the  appropriateness  of  the  GARCH  model.  In  addition,  the  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  D-
statistic drops from 0.87 to 0.07 on the residuals, indicating that the residuals display a much better
fit with a Normal distribution. The jump magnitudes and probabilities are estimated by calibrating
the  model  to  a  cross-section  of  option  prices  the  day  before  the  FDA  announcement.  These
estimates are also provided in Table 5.
Using this model, we estimate that the call-spreads Cephalon purchased had a value of
about $3.48 each, or $8.7 million in aggregate. The Asian feature of the option is found to subtract
about 3 cents of value from each option, while the dilution effect adds 13 cents.  Consequently,
ignoring any informational impact the option transaction may have generated, under our analysis the
deadweight cost of the risk management program (the apparent mispricing of the transaction relative
to our estimated price) using the warrants is $1.1 million. It would be especially instructive to know
whether the price that Cephalon paid differed from the price an independent party might have paid
for similar options on the firm, but we do not have this information.
This  deadweight  cost  must  be  compared  with  the  deadweight  costs  of  the  firm’s
alternatives.    Based  on  management’s  20%  estimate  of  the  costs  of  raising  equity,  to  raise  $45
million it would bear costs of $9 million.  Assuming that the options would yield their maximum
payoff, $45 million, upon FDA approval, the question facing Cephalon’s managers was whether to
bear a sure pre-approval deadweight cost of $1.1 million to fund its need, or a much higher $927
million that would be incurred only if the drug was approved. The probability of FDA approval of
Myotrophin bears on the decision. The break-even probability may be calculated as follows: let π be
the probability that Cephalon management assessed for Myotrophin’s approval. Then, the expected
deadweight cost of equity financing is given by  0 ) 1 ( 9 × − + × π π M .  The break-even probability
is approximately 12%. In other words, if management believed that approval of Myotrophin had a
12% probability or higher, then the option-based financing yields lower expected deadweight costs
than issuing equity.
41   If the relevant deadweight costs are much smaller, say the 5% discount on
the shares put to the CCP holders, then the breakeven rises to 49%.
42    If we think that there are
virtually no costs of external financing in the good news state, then the option proposal is clearly
inferior.  None of these breakevens captures the possibility that Cephalon might be unable to raise
equity later at virtually any price.
Bankers have suggested an alternative break-even approach that managers should consider,
consistent with their concerns about minimizing economic ownership dilution of existing equity
holders. To generate $45 million, the option plan requires that Cephalon issue 490,000 shares in
advance, or 1.8% of the existing shares (assuming that the post-FDA stock price exceeds $39.50).
Were it to raise equity at $35 per share (net of all costs) after learning of the FDA’s approval, it
would need to issue 1.29 million shares, or 4.7% of the firm’s shares.  In both cases, the firm raises
$45 million only if the FDA approves the drug, and managers have to consider what fraction of the
firm they wish to give up to do so.  Here, the break-even is slightly below 40%, indicating that if the
deal is more than 40% likely to proceed, then existing shareholders might prefer the option proposal
                                                                
41 This comparison ignores (a) the time value of money, which would make the future losses due to the equity
sale smaller in present value, and (b) apparent risk aversion by the Cephalon decision-makers, which would
make the certainty-equivalent of the risky outcome more than the expected loss given a concave utility
function.  The first factor would tend to raise the break-even and the second factor would tend to lower the
break-even.  The apparent risk-neutral probability of approval can be calculated conditional on the point
estimates of the conditional stock prices given by the analysts reported in Exhibit 5, and tends to range from
20-45%.
42 The purchase option requires Cephalon to pay either $40.275 million in cash or $42.369 million in shares,
valued at their average market value in the period prior to delivery.  One could think of this difference as the
deadweight cost of this transaction.28
in that they would prefer to give up a smaller fraction of the firm to obtain the same economic
resources.
These  breakevens  may  provide  management  with  some  guidance  for  thinking  about  the
different alternatives.  Given their priors of the likelihood of approval, managers could determine
which  alternative  provides  the  lowest  deadweight  costs  or  the  lowest  dilution  of  existing
shareholders.
VI.  Was it really risk management? Alternative explanations
So  far  in  this  paper  we  have  analyzed  the  derivative  transaction  under  the  stated
management rationale—as an integral part of their overall risk management strategy.  As we work
through our analysis to back up this explanation, not all of the logical steps needed to support this
argument can be firmly defended.  In particular, it is arguable that Cephalon had insufficient cash to
repurchase the rights to Myotrophin or that external financing was so expensive so as to justify the
option transaction.
Some commentators felt that the deal was not risk management, but rather an attempt to
“signal to the market” the firm’s confidence about the upcoming FDA approval.
43  However, this
signaling  interpretation  seems  inconsistent  with  the  facts  at  hand.    The  outcome  of  the  FDA
approval process would be revealed publicly within a month, and earlier revelation of the firm’s
estimates of success would not seem to have any impact on the firm’s long-run ability to finance
itself or on executive compensation. There were no material decisions that would be made prior to
the FDA approval that earlier revelation of information would affect.
Other  observers  suggested  Cephalon's  transaction  might  be  a  high-tech  share  buyback.
Through its exchange of 490,000 shares for 2,500,000 capped call options the firm established a
state-contingent buyback program, where the  ex post  magnitude  of  the  buyback  depends  on  the
                                                                
43 See Hamilton (1997) and Ward (1997).29
payoff of the options.  Were the FDA to approve the drug and were the calls to mature in the
money, the transaction would lead to the net buyback of 2,010,000 shares if Cephalon were to settle
the transaction by purchasing shares at the strike rather taking a cash payment. Conversely, were the
FDA to disapprove the drug and the calls to mature worthless, the firm would have issued 490,000
shares.
44  However, given that the firm was prepared to issue shares, and in light of its intention to
cash-settle the options, it is difficult to conceive of the transaction as a buyback program.
Finally, others saw the transaction as a way to make an informed and leveraged bet on a
product that Cephalon knew well, or a “let’s-raise-the-ante” strategy.
45  Based on our conversations
with the managers, this motivation seems unlikely or secondary, although we acknowledge that
even in a clinical study with a willing company, it is impossible to reject this alternative explanation
out of hand.  Financial theory does not rule out speculative trading, and it can justify precisely these
kinds of bets, where firms have substantial information and are capable of bearing the losses if they
are wrong.
46
Certainly, private information by management may help explain the deadweight cost of the
options risk management strategy.  SBC Warburg’s traders might have feared that Cephalon was
better informed than they were about either the “true” level or volatility of Cephalon stock price and
adjusted the option price accordingly.  By trading shares for options, the deal mitigates some of this
problem, because the value of both shares and options would be determined jointly.  However, as
the deltas of the shares and option package are not equal, there could remain conflicts of interest.
                                                                
44 Ex ante, the firm's net position was a buyback of 445,000 shares, evaluating the delta-equivalent share
position in its purchased calls.
45 See Pauly (1997).
46 See Stulz (1996) for a discussion.  In Cephalon's case, the firm’s officers might personally benefit from
increasing the firm’s bet on its new product. The executive officers and directors jointly held many more
options on the firm than shares in the firm: the eleven officers and directors held 363,935 shares as of March
1997, but exerciseable options on 762,501 shares.  As option holders, they might prefer transactions that
increase the volatility of the firm’s equity. In this case, the proposed option transaction effectively levers up
the firm and increase the stock’s volatility .  This type of preference would be consistent with the evidence
from Tufano (1996) or Schrand and Unal (1998), who find that firms whose managers hold more options
appear to tolerate higher firm volatility.30
To  understand  Cephalon’s  latitude  for  profiting  from  private  information  under  the
proposed deal, we use the model in the previous section to re-estimate the value of the proposed
stock-for-options trade for a range of stock prices and long-run volatilities (unconditional means of
volatilities).  Suppose that Cephalon’s managers knew the “true” stock price or volatility or both,
while SBC had access only to less-informed public information.  Under what circumstances could
its exchange of stock-for-options be a valuable speculative position for Cephalon?   In Figure 2, we
plot the profitability to Cephalon of the proposed trade under various stock prices and volatilities.
If the managers had private information about only the true volatility, the proposed structure
would not permit them to profitability enter into the exchange with SBC.  There is no volatility that
would make the trade a positive one to Cephalon if the $20 market price of the stock were an
unbiased estimate of the firm’s value on the day the deal was executed.  Thus, Cephalon could not
have traded profitably strictly on the basis of private information regarding the true level of long-run
volatility.
However, if Cephalon had private information that its “true” stock price exceeded $22 (10%
above the market price), it could have profited from the transaction (given the current volatility).
However, in this case it would have done better by buying the options in cash, rather than paying
for them in undervalued stock.
Nevertheless, this exercise illustrates that if a firm were to have private information on the
value of the underlying asset (the stock), it could profitably trade derivatives on the stock, or in this
case, trade stock for calls.  The informational asymmetries regarding the underlying plague the
equity  derivative  as  well,  which  may  explain  the  apparent  transaction  costs  of  using  equity
derivatives as a risk management tool.31
VII. Followup and Implications
Cephalon issued a press release on Wednesday, April 9, 1997, announcing its proposal to
enter into the option transaction.  Bloomberg reporters filed two stories on the transaction that day,
as did Reuters, and stories appeared in the print media on Thursday, April 10.  The transaction was
the subject of a column in Barrons magazine, dated Monday, April 14.  Figure 3 reports the market
reaction to Cephalon’s announcement.  Over the three-day window around the initial announcement
on April 9, 1997, Cephalon enjoyed positive abnormal returns of +3.3% or +2.3%, using as market
indices the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and Russell 2000 indices, respectively.
This  suggests  that  the  informational  impact  of  the  transaction  was  positive:    unlike  an  equity
issuance, there was an upward revision in firm value.
On May 8, the day after the option deal was executed, the FDA advisory panel convened.
Trading in Cephalon stock was halted that day.  The panel voted 6-3 that there was not “substantial”
evidence that Myotrophin was effective in the treatment of ALS, and this information was revealed
after trading hours.
On Friday, May 9, trading in Cephalon resumed, and the stock closed at $13, a drop of 35%
from the last closing price.  This corresponds to a one-day abnormal loss of approximately 36%,
calculated as shown in Figure 3.  Volume for the day was 8.4 million shares, 10.5 times larger than
the average daily trading volume in the period between Cephalon’s announcement of the option
transaction  and  the  FDA  advisory  panel  meeting.    Subsequently,  the  FDA  delayed  its
recommendation on Myotrophin beyond the six-month option window.  The average closing price
for the twenty trading days preceding the option maturity was about $12.50, and as a result, the
options expired worthless.
While  the  FDA  panel’s  decision  made  Cephalon’s  “backwards”  insurance  policy
unnecessary,  one  cannot  conclude  that  the  purchase  of  options  was  an  imprudent  corporate
transaction based on this ex post assessment.  Rather, one must probe the ex ante rationales for the
transaction, using data that managers had at that time. Our analysis suggests that many—but not32
all—of  the  premises  that  would  justify  the  option  transaction  can  be  supported.  Had  the  FDA
approved Myotrophin, Cephalon would have had a valuable investment opportunity, the right to buy
back the rights to the drug.  Standard external financing would have been expensive for Cephalon,
as it is for other firms, although probably much less so in the wake of a positive decision by the
panel.  Finally, the option transaction was likely to deliver cash to Cephalon when this investment
opportunity was presented.
However  a  few  key  premises  behind  the  cash-flow  hedging  arguments  were  missing  or
questionable.  It is not clear that the firm needed any external financing to enjoy the positive returns
from buying back the rights to Myotrophin.  Its need to raise extra external funds arose from the
desire to enjoy a particular type of accounting treatment and its aversion to paying in stock.  If the
firm were willing to forgo the accounting that would produce higher subsequent earnings and pay
for the contractual purchase option with equity, or if it were willing to pay for some or all of the
tender offer with equity, it could have funded the cash requirements of the buyback with internal
resources.  The decision seems predicated on two assumptions that we find hard to judge, regarding
the impact of differing accounting treatments and the distributions of stock to the limited partners on
market value.  While we respect that managers must make decisions given imperfect information,
we  have  reservations  whether  this  transaction  can  be  justified  given  these  factors.    Finally,  we
suspect that raising external financing after the FDA approved the drug might have been a relatively
low-cost choice.
More broadly, we believe the Cephalon case raises a number of interesting questions for
students  and  practitioners  of  risk  management.    First,  while  accounting  treatment  sometimes
discourages  firms  from  engaging  in  risk  management,  here  it  served  to  encourage  Cephalon  to
engage in a particular risk management strategy.  In particular, the treatment of R&D expenses gave
rise to a preference for tendering for the limited partnership interests, which in turn created a cash
flow need beyond the resources available to the firm.  The “big bath” accounting treatment sought
by the firm is understudied and we suggest can support additional research.  While this particular33
form of accounting-induced risk management is probably rare, the relationship between accounting
rules and risk management behavior is an important area for future study.
Second, risk management is predicated upon the notion of costly external finance.  Here, we
tried to get managers to quantify the costs of financing.  While part of their answer was consistent
with academic theory, their concerns for the absolute cost and availability of financing are not fully
considered by risk management theory.  Financing risk is a critical uncertainty that motivated this
transaction.  Managers inhabit a world that can suddenly become inhospitable to financing their
firms, and overall market levels and prices motivate risk management more so than the firm-specific
“deadweight” costs of financing.  Further research into the various costs of external financing is
required if we are to implement risk management programs.
Third,  academic  models  of  risk  management  often  assume  that  external  financing  has
deadweight costs, while risk management does not.  Yet, the use of equity derivatives as a risk
management tool may subject the firm to the same sort of information asymmetries and deadweight
costs that an equity issue would.   Our contribution here is to attempt to quantity the size of these
deadweight  costs  and  explicitly  compare  them  to  those  that  would  arise  from  more  traditional
financing.    We  also  attempt  to  measure  the  magnitude  of  informational  asymmetries  that  might
allow a firm to profitably trade on its own stock, and which likely affect the level of transaction
costs.
Fourth, risk management decisions cannot be made in a vacuum.  These choices must be
evaluated in the context of the full menu of financing and investment decisions in the firm.  Here,
the firm had a valuable existing contractual option (for which it had already paid), whose existence
might obviate the need to purchase options.   More generally, it could have delivered shares to the
partners under the tender offer, then carefully managed the resultant sell-off, perhaps through a
secondary offering, to minimize the stock price impact of the distribution.
Finally, we see that corporate managers who are using relatively simple pricing models,
may be at a competitive disadvantage when analyzing even seemingly “simple” equity derivatives.34
Our analysis of the value of the negative call warrants purchased by Cephalon differs materially
from the first-pass analysis, and if corporations hope to transact in equity derivatives, they may need
additional in-house financial engineering skills to ensure that they are getting fair execution for
these trades.
In conclusion, we can learn a great deal from Cephalon’s experience.  The use of equity
derivatives as a risk management vehicle is likely to increase in importance over time, and we can
leverage  firms’  experiences  to  make  these  customized  transactions  better  meet  the  needs  of
corporations and their shareholders.35
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(1)   Cephalon and Chiron split after-tax profits on Myotrophin equally.  This is indicated in Cephalon, Inc.’s 10-K, December 1996, p. 53.
(2)   Represents Cephalon’s share of profits less the payment under the tender offer, which we believe is a taxable expense. This calculation does not include a
terminal value, which understates the value of buying back Myotrophin.
(3)   This discount rate is used by Wilson and Schmidt, (January 26, 1996, p. 11), and Lonergan et al. (February 20, 1997, p. 3.) in valuing Cephalon.
(4)   Represents Cephalon’s share of profits less the payment under the contractual purchase option, which we believe are taxable expenses. This calculation does
not include a terminal value, which understates the value of buying back Myotrophin.40
Table 2
Proforma projections of Cephalon’s internal cash flow and investment needs
US$, millions If tender for CCP Interests If exercise purchase option
Cash flow projections NOTE Parameter 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
Myotrophin pre-tax profits $0 $56 $110 $0 $56 $110
Other pretax drug profits $21 $49 $65 $21 $49 $65
Net interest income (expense) $1 ($5) ($6) $3 ($3) ($1)
Research and development ($68) ($75) ($81) ($68) ($75) ($81)
SG & A ($37) ($40) ($55) ($37) ($40) ($55)
Payment to CCP (1) ($125) $0 $0 ($16) ($17) ($74)
Total pretax profits ($208) ($16) $33 ($97) ($30) ($37)
Taxes ( 2 ) 0 % $ 0 $ 0$ 0 $ 0$ 0$ 0
After-tax profits ($208) ($16) $33 ($97) ($30) ($37)
Non-cash items and (3) ($7) ($7) ($7) ($7) ($7) ($7)
   Working capital needs
Cash from operations ($215) ($23) $26 ($104) ($37) ($44)
Cash from investing activities (4) ($6) ($6) ($6) ($6) ($6) ($6)
Cash from financing activities
   Scheduled repayments (5) ($5) ($2) ($1) ($5) ($2) ($1)
   Proceeds from convertible $30 $30
Cash flow requirement   (6) ($196) ($30) $19 ($85) ($44) ($51)
These proforma projections draw upon analyst reports (Malloy (March 20, 1997), Wilson and Schmidt (January 26, 1996), and Lonergan, Stone, and Reed
(February 20, 1997) and other public sources, but reflect the authors' interpretations of a composite of these professional analyses.  Further details are available
from the authors.
(1) From Table 2.
(2) Cephalon has a net operating loss of $75 million as of the beginning of 1997, and would generate additional losses in the subsequent years so that no
cash taxes would be paid over the three-year horizon.
(3,4) Authors’ estimate from historical data.
(5) Repayment schedule given in Cephalon, Inc., 10-K, December 1996.
(6) Represents the amount of cash that would have to be raised either by reducing the existing cash balance or by new financing.  Cephalon held cash and
marketable securities balance equal to $146 million as of December 31, 1996.  It anticipated being able to raise $100 million in financing over the
coming two years, excluding funds raised through the proposed option transaction.41
Table 3
Cephalon’s external financing history and the market impact of its financing announcement, 1993-1997
Abnormal returns for Cephalon stock are calculated using daily data for Cephalon stock, the CRSP value-weighted index, and the Russell 2000 index.  The
Russell 2000 data are from Datastream.  The abnormal return on day t, εct, is given by  εct = R ct - (α + βRmt), where parameters α and β are estimated using the
Scholes and Williams (1977) correction for nonsynchronous trading.   The estimation period for the parameters is the 250-day period preceding the event
window.  The event window is a three-day period commencing the day before the announcement, where the date of the announcement is considered day 0 in
event time.  Accordingly, the event window corresponds to days -1, 0, and +1.  The announcement date is identified by a search on Lexis/Nexis.  In all cases but
one, the 1993 equity issue, the first press report of the financing corresponds exactly to the date the intention to issue new equity is first filed with the SEC.  In
1993, Cephalon filed with the SEC on February 8, and the first press report is on February 9.  In this case, February 8 is considered day 0.  The column labeled
“Fees” reports the underwriting expenses and other expenses as a percentage of the gross proceeds.  The columns “CAR” reflect the cumulative three-day
abnormal returns, as described above.  The columns “Offering Dilution”  report the dollar value of the cumulative abnormal returns divided by the gross
proceeds.
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7.6% -42.0% -29.3% -7.6% -5.3%42
Table 4
Analysts’ projections of the value of Cephalon common stock,
 conditional on whether FDA panel were to approve Myotrophin.









not given $30-35 per share in twelve months, “based on
our assumption of a favorable FDA review of
both Myotrophin and Provigil.”
(March 20, 1997)
After the FDA meeting, before trading: “We
anticipate that Cephalon’s stock will trade off
sharply this morning.  Our best sense is that
the stock could find support in the $12 range.”
(May 9, 1997)
Cowen (2) February 20, 1997 not given $40-45 per share at the end of fiscal year
1997 “keyed primarily to Myotrophin’s
success.”





May 7, 1997 70% “A positive outcome should send Cephalon’s
stock into the thirties since out model predicts
Cephalon to earn $2.21 in 2000, implying a
current stock value of $37 (based on a 30
multiple and a 25% discount rate).”
“A rejection would most likely knock the
stock down to the low teens.”
Notes:
(1) Malloy (March 20, 1997; May 9, 1997).
(2) Lonergan, Stone, and Reed (February 20, 1997).
(3) Wilson and Schmidt (May 7, 1997).43
Table 5
Parameter Estimates for Cephalon Stock Price Process
This table provides estimates for the GJR-GARCH model
St+1/St = exp[α0 + α1σt
2 + σtεt+1 ]*(1 + J*1{t=t*})
σt






where t* represents the date of the FDA announcement. The estimates, except for jump parameters, were obtained using 341 observations for
Cephalon beginning January, 1996 and ending May 6, 1997. The jump parameters were estimated by calibrating the stock process to a cross-














Schematic of Cephalon’s Financial Obligations to Cephalon Clinical Partners, L.P.
External Decision Decisions facing Cephalon Management
Buyback(1) Tender  v. Cash  v. External Options
FDA  Decision Purchase Stock Financing bought









FDA  Approval Cash
Option
Some
Purchase  No option
Option (3)
Stock
No  approval No
 (1) Regulatory approval of Myotrophin in the U.S. or Europe would trigger the requirement to make a Milestone Payment to the CCP holders, equal to $16
million.  Cephalon could choose to make this payment in cash, stock, or any combination, at their option.
(2) The 8-K notes that there is “no assurance that any agreement can be reached with the General Partner to acquire the limited partnership interests.  Even if an
agreement can be reached, the Company estimates that to reach an agreement the purchase price could be significant, possibly in the $125 million range,”
including the Milestone Payment.
(3)  The Purchase Option would be exercisable for a 45 day window beginning the earlier of (a) the later of (i) the month in which the partners received interim
license payments equal to 15% of their capital contributions, or (ii) 24 months after the first commercial sale of Myotrophin in the territory, or (b) 48 months
after the first commercial sale within the territory.  As a practical matter, (a.i) appears to be the binding constraint.  Under the purchase option Cephalon would
buy back the rights by making a purchase option payment, equal to $40.275 million in cash or $42.369 million in stock, plus paying royalties. Royalties would be
10.1%  of sales (reducing to 5.0% after a specified return is earned by the former limited partners) of Myotrophin sales in North America and Europe for an 11-
year period.45
Figure 2
Contour Plot of Profit/Cost to Cephalon for Various “True” Stock Prices and Long-Run Volatilities
This plot shows the total dollar gain or loss (in millions) to Cephalon from exchanging shares for options if the true stock price and the true unconditional mean
of volatility were different from that given by the stock price and estimated volatility on the day of the transaction. Each line in the graph below represents a
profit contour. The label for the contour represents the profit level of that contour. For example, the $2 M contour shows all of the true stock price–volatility
combinations that would result in a $2 million profit to Cephalon for the transaction. The stock price and implied volatility on the day of the transaction are
shown by the heavy black square on the graph.



























Market Reaction to Announcement of Cephalon Option Transaction and FDA Decision
Abnormal returns are calculated using daily data for Cephalon stock, the CRSP value-weighted index, and the Russell 2000 index.  The Russell 2000 data are
from Datastream.  The abnormal return on day t, εct, is given by  εct = R ct - (α + βRmt), where parameters α and β are estimated using the Scholes and Williams
(1977) correction for nonsynchronous trading.   The estimation period for the parameters is the 250-day period preceding the event.  The event window for the
initial announcement is a three-day period centered around April 9, 1997, the date of the announcement.  The abnormal return for the second announcement is
calculated only for the first trading day following the FDA announcement.  There was no trading of Cephalon stock on May 8, 1997, the date of the panel
meeting.





















































































































































































Option deal announcement:  4/9/97
4/8/97-4/10/97 (3 days) CAR with CRSP VW Portfolio: +3.3 %
4/8/97-4/10/97 (3 days) CAR with Russell 2000: +2.3 %
Day after advisory panel recommends against approval:  5/9/97
5/9/97 (1 day) CAR with CRSP VW Portfolio:  -35.8 %
5/9/97 (1 day) CAR with Russell 2000:  -36.0 %A Appendix
Many professionals may value equity options such as those purchased by
Cephalon with the Black-Scholes/Merton model. Valuation using this model
was presented in the text. However, a number of contractual features of the
Cephalon options, as well as the particular situation of the …rm, result in
the Black-Scholes/Merton model being inappropriate in this situation. In
order to value these options more accurately, we develop and estimate a
GARCH-Jump option pricing model for the underlying stochastic process
which includes features such as accretion e¤ects and path-dependency of the
contractual provisions. With more and more …rms transacting in deriva-
tives on their own stock, the modelling used in this paper should see wide
applicability.
This model relaxes several of the assumptions in the Black-Scholes/Merton
model, which allows for better modelling of several contractual features of the
options. First, the claims give Cephalon the unusual ability to buy an option
on its own stock. Thus, these claims are in fact warrants.1 However, since
the warrants are owned by Cephalon, the dilution e¤ect typically caused by
exercising warrants works in the reverse direction here, and therefore must
be modeled implicitly.
Second, a lognormal distribution is a poor descriptor of the conditional
distribution of Cephalon’s stock price. This is easily seen from recent his-
torical data on Cephalon’s stock. The stock price displays both skewness
and excess kurtosis. To accommodate these patterns, we use a stochastic
volatility process for the stock price. This immediately brings up the issue of
estimation, which is not trivial for stochastic volatility models. To simplify
the estimation problem we calculate the discrete-time GARCH process that
converges to the stochastic volatility model, similar to Nelson (1990), and
then estimate this GARCH process.
In addition to stochastic volatility, we need to incorporate the fact that a
jump event will a¤ect the stock price during the life of the options. This event
(the FDA announcement) will have a substantial impact on the stock price. A
jump process such as that used in Merton (1976) cannot be used here because
the jump will occur on a known date, though with an unknown direction and
1Several papers have dealt with the topic of warrant pricing. Examples include Schwartz
(1977) and Constantinides (1984). For this paper, we utilize the simple approach of Galai
& Schneller (1978). Crouhy & Galai (1994) and Schulz & Trautmann (1994) examine a
more accurate valuation technique that accounts for the leverage of a …rm.
Amagnitude. To account for these features, the stock process is modeled using
a GARCH-Jump process where the jump is a one-point jump. This model
may be used to price options on any security where the underlying stock
will be hit by a jump at a known date, though of unknown magnitude and
direction. Examples include options on …rms that are scheduled to make a
public announcement, …rms in the midst of major litigation where it is known
that a judgement will be made within a narrow time frame, or …rms in the
middle of merger negotiations, where again, the results will be announced
within a narrow time frame.
Third, the options are path-dependent, in that the value of the options at
expiration depends on the average of the stock price over the month preceding
the expiration date. All of these features could contribute substantially to
the price of the Cephalon warrants, and each needs to be incorporated into
any valuation model.
A.1 Time-Varying Volatility
The pricing of these warrants depends critically on the conditional distribu-
tion of Cephalon’s stock price. As mentioned above, under the commonly-
used assumption in Black-Scholes/Merton that the stock price follows a ge-
ometric Brownian motion process
dS
S
= ¹dt+ ¾d W t (1)
where ¹ and ¾ are constants, Wt is a Wiener process, and the stock’s condi-
tional distribution is lognormal. However, if (1) is estimated for Cephalon’s
stock, an inspection of the residuals from the estimation shows that the as-
sumption of normality is strongly violated. From January 1996 to May of
1997, the skewness of Cephalon’s daily log stock returns is ¡1:13 with a
standard error of .26, while the kurtosis is 15:54 with a standard error of .13.
These values are signi…cantly di¤erent from those expected for a normal dis-
tribution. A more formal goodness-of-…t test for normality can be conducted
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistic. This statistic yields a value of
.49 for the log stock returns, while the 1% critical value for the test is :087.
Thus, the test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of normality in the log
returns.
To account for this non-lognormality in Cephalon’s stock returns, we
Bincorporate stochastic volatility using the process
dS
S
=( a0 + a1¾
2
t)dt + ¾t dWs
d¾
2





where a0, a1, b0, b1,a n db2 represent constants, and W¾ is a Wiener process
that has a constant correlation ½ with Ws. Due to the stochastic nature of the
volatility process, this model exhibits excess kurtosis. In addition, depending
on the sign of the correlation between the Wiener processes, the model can
also display positive or negative skewness. The other assumptions implicit in
the model above, such as mean-reverting volatility and volatility impacting
the stock return’s drift, are based on empirically observed characteristics
common to a wide cross-section of stocks. Thus, the model in (2) is capable
of displaying the key patterns of non-lognormality observed in Cephalon’s
stock price.
However, stochastic volatility processes of this form are extremely di¢cult
to estimate. Common techniques used have included GMM (and EMM),
Kalman …ltering, simulated maximum likelihood, and Bayesian estimation.2
The choice between these usually becomes a tradeo¤ between accuracy and
computation time.
We approach this estimation problem in a slightly di¤erent manner. In-
stead of modifying the estimation technique, we will instead modify the
stochastic process so that it is easy to estimate and then rely on convergence
theory to obtain reliable estimates and prices. To this end, we modify the
basic geometric process above to incorporate a time-varying volatility that is
conditionally deterministic. The model that is used to accomplish this is the




















Since the GARCH model has a time-varying volatility process, it is capa-
ble of displaying the kind of excess kurtosis found in the Cephalon’s returns.
2See Melino & Turnbull (1990), Gallant, Hsieh, & Tauchen (1994), Harvey, Ruiz, &
Shephard (1994), Danielsson (1994), and Jacquier, Polson, & Rossi (1994) for examples of
these estimation methods in the context of stochastic volatility models.
CThe GJR GARCH(1,1) model di¤ers from the standard GARCH(1,1) model
due to the addition of the term ¯2¾2
t¡1 max(0;¡"t)2. This term allows for
asymmetric volatility shocks, i.e., negative shocks tend to increase volatility
more than positive shocks. This allows us to capture the leverage e¤ect that
has been observed in stock market data by Black (1976) and many others.
This asymmetric volatility impact causes the conditional distribution in the
GJR GARCH model to display skewness. Finally, by adding a variance term,
®1¾2
t, to the return process, we allow for a time-varying mean as well. The
conditional mean in this case is linear in the conditional variance.
Even though the GARCH model above incorporates the non-normal fea-
tures we observe in Cephalon’s returns, we need to show that the GARCH
model approximates some form of the stochastic volatility model posed above.
To do this, we informally derive the continuous-time limit of the GARCH pro-
cess.3 Since we will be taking the limit as the time interval shrinks, we will
rewrite the GARCH process in a way such that it explicitly accounts for the
length of the time interval and such that the limiting drifts and di¤usions of





















where h is the time interval. Therefore, the trading period, T, is split up
into T
h = n trading intervals. With this de…nition, the conditional means and
variances of the two processes can be calculated. The conditional means are
given by
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3See Nelson (1990) for a formal derivation for ARCH processes.
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Thus, the continuous-time GJR GARCH(1,1)-in-mean process for the stock
converges in distribution to the stochastic volatility process given in (2).
While the one-period ahead conditional volatility in this GARCH model
is deterministic, prices under this model converge to prices for the purely
stochastic volatility model in (2) as the time interval becomes small, and
consequently the prices of any European contingent claims written on a stock
governed by these GARCH dynamics converge in distribution to the prices
of similar claims written on the continuous-time stochastic volatility process.
For daily data, these price di¤erences will be insigni…cant.
Parameter estimates for the GARCH model using Cephalon’s daily stock
returns from January 1996 to May 1997 are given in Table 5. Most of the
volatility parameters are found to be statistically signi…cant, indicating the
appropriateness of the GARCH model. In addition, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
D-statistic drops to .07 on the residuals, indicating that the residuals display
a much better …t with a normal distribution. The hypothesis of normality
can no longer be rejected at the 1% level as before.
EA.2 Risk-Neutral GJR GARCH Process
In order to price the Cephalon warrants, the stochastic process for the stock
must be derived under the martingale measure, ~ P, given that under the
actual measure, P, it is governed by the GJR GARCH(1,1)-M process.4 One
consequence of using a GARCH model for the underlying stock price process
is that the pricing of contingent claims is no longer preference-free. Therefore,
we start o¤ by de…ning the pricing kernel.5 Let »t represent the pricing
kernel in the economy. The pricing kernel simply represents the intertemporal














The variable Át is a time-varying function that determines the market price
of risk in the economy. Át is determined as a result of equilibrium given a
set of supply and demand functions in an economy. If Át is known, then the
Radon-Nikodym theorem may be used to determine the martingale measure
in the economy. Suppose that agents’ beliefs in the economy are captured by
the probability space (;F;P) and ! 2 . Then martingale measure, ~ P,i s





where the Radon-Nikodym derivative ´t is given by the expression












4Amin & Ng (1993) study the risk neutral process for an ARCH stock price process,
while Duan (1995) analyzes the risk neutral process for a GARCH(p,q) process.
5The pricing kernel, or marginal rate of substitution, is needed here because we are
undertaking an equilibrium pricing model in an incomplete market. An alternative to this
approach is the no-arbitrage model, which attempts to match a cross-section of option
prices (see, for example, Rubinstein (1994), Derman & Kani (1994), or Dupire (1994)).
For the no-arbitrage approach to work well, however, a su¢ciently large cross-section of
options maturing on the same date is necessary. Such a cross-section is not available on
Cephalon stock.
FBecause »t represents the marginal rate of substitution in the economy, the






where the expectation is taken with respect to the P measure. Substituting
from (3) and (5), we can derive the market price of risk, Át,i nt e r m so ft h e
parameters of the stock process.
Át =





Now, we can use a discrete-time version of Girsanov’s theorem to relate a
sequence of standard normal random variables under the ~ P m e a s u r et oas e t
under the P measure. De…ne ~ "t to be a standard Normal random variable
under ~ P.T h e n~ "t is related to "t by the relationship
~ "t = "t + Át
We can substitute from this expression into (3) to derive the stock price
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2 + ¯3¾
2
t¡1(~ "t ¡ Át)
2 (7)
where Át is given by (6). Note that the drift terms ®0 and ®1 are both
present in the risk neutral process for the stock price and therefore will also
be present in the option pricing formula. The implication of this is that,
unlike with the Black-Scholes/Merton pricing formula, the drift of the stock
price process enters into the option pricing formula. This dependence is due
to the non-Markov nature of the GARCH process.
As noted earlier, the term Át can be thought of as the market price of
risk at time t. Therefore, another crucial di¤erence between this setup and
that with geometric Brownian motion for the underlying is that this setup
includes a time varying risk premium.
GA.3 GARCH-Jump Process
Before we can price the warrants, the issue of how the FDA advisory com-
mittee’s recommendation will impact the stock price needs to be considered.
The announcement of this recommendation represents the sudden release of
extremely relevant information to the market and therefore should have a
large impact on the valuation of Cephalon’s stock as well as its volatility
level. The GARCH model we have constructed does not adequately capture
this particular shock. To this end, we add a one-point jump term to the
stochastic processes for the stock price and volatility. The complete stochas-
tic process for the stock under the martingale measure is therefore given by
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2 + j1ft¸t¤g
(8)
The jump term 1ft=t¤g on the stock price re‡ects the large impact that the
FDA committee’s recommendation will have on the stock price. The jump
t e r mh a sav a l u eo f0 ,e xc e p ta tt i m e t = t¤, when the FDA announcement
is made. At this time, the Bernoulli random variable, J, which re‡ects the
magnitude of the jump, takes on a value Ju with probability p or Jd with
probability 1 ¡ p.6
In addition, the jump term 1ft¸t¤g on the volatility process indicates that
the information released will change the unconditional mean of the …rm’s
volatility process. This jump term takes on a value of 0 until time t = t¤,a t
which point it takes on a value of 1 and stays at that value thereafter. The
jump magnitude, j, is determined at time t = t¤ by a Bernoulli distribution.
It takes on a value of ju with probability p or jd with probability 1¡p.T h e
value of j then stays the same thereafter. Thus, the unconditional mean of








Estimation of the jump parameters cannot be accomplished by using the
historical time series of the stock price since the jump term is not present in
6Note that these are risk-neutral quantities only and should not be interpreted as the
actual parameters governing the jump process.
Hthis series.7 Therefore, to estimate the jump parameters, we rely on the prices
of currently traded options on Cephalon’s stock. If these options mature
after the date of the FDA committee’s decision, then the options incorporate
the jump into their prices. Therefore, we estimate the jump parameters
by …tting our option pricing model to cross-sectional data on the prices of
Cephalon options maturing in August. The pricing model utilizes Monte
Carlo simulation with a control variate for variance reduction. The time
interval used in the model is daily. The upward jump magnitudes, Ju and
ju, are estimated to be 1.19 and 0.17, respectively, on May 7, while the
downward jump magnitudes, Jd and jd, are estimated to be 0.64 and 0.25,
respectively. We also estimated these quantity one month prior, on April
8, using May options. Since no substantial news was released between the
two dates regarding the probability of approval of Myotrophin, we would
not expect the jump parameters to be signi…cantly di¤erent from each other.
This is con…rmed as Ju and ju, for example, are estimated to be 1.23 and
0.18, respectively.
A.4 Dilution E¤ect of Warrants
The …nal valuation of the Cephalon options also needs to account for the
dilution e¤ect caused by the warrants. In the case of standard warrants, ex-
ercising the warrants increases the number of shares of the …rm outstanding.
Therefore, exercise of the warrants means that the …rm’s pro…ts are spread
out over a larger number of shares, thereby decreasing the value of each share.
In Cephalon’s case, the dilution e¤ect is caused by Cephalon itself when it
exercises the options and thereby buys back its own stock. Therefore, one
key di¤erence between Cephalon’s warrants and standard warrants is that
the number of shares of the …rm outstanding after the transaction decreases
as a result of exercise. Secondly, unlike typical stock buybacks, upon exercise
Cephalon will pay the exercise price of $21.50 per share for stock that has
a value higher than $21.50.8 Therefore, Cephalon has essentially underpaid
for an asset, and the resulting value-added from this underpayment accrues
7Actually, it can be argued that the market knows the presence of the future jump
shocks and therefore incorporates it into Cephalon’s stock price and volatility. However,
without a good model for valuing the stock itself, attempting to estimate the jump terms
from the stock price series is beyond the scope of this paper.
8After all, Cephalon will only exercise the warrants if the stock has a value higher than
the exercise price at the maturity date.
Ito those owning shares in the …rm. This serves to enhance the value of all of
Cephalon’s outstanding shares, as well as shares purchased by Cephalon. As
a result, the dilution e¤ect for these warrants works in the opposite direction
to that of typical warrants. The dilution e¤ect of Cephalon’s warrants will
add value if the options are exercised.
A.5 Final Valuation
With all of the parameters estimated for the jump-GARCH model, we can
now price the Cephalon warrants. The pricing model needs to incorporate
three non-standard features of the warrants. First, the payo¤ on the warrant
at expiration is determined by averaging the underlying over the previous
twenty days and subtracting o¤ the strike. Second, a cap of $39.50 is placed
on this average. Thus, these warrants are essentially capped Asian options.
Third, the warrants are exercised by the company against its own stock, so
there is a negative dilution e¤ect if the warrants are exercised. The Monte
Carlo pricing model used earlier to estimate the jump parameters is modi…ed
to account for all of these features.
The price of the Cephalon warrants is calculated to be $3.48 per option.9
As expected, the cap feature has the biggest impact on the warrant price.
Without the cap of $39.50 in place on the underlying, the price of the warrants
would be $4.98 each. The averaging feature has an insigni…cant impact on the
price because the averaging period is very short–only 20 days. The dilution
e¤ect is substantial, adding approximately $.13 to the price of the option.
As mentioned above, the dilution e¤ect adds value to the warrant because if
the …rm exercises the option, it pays $21.50 per share for 2.5 million shares
that have a higher value. This enhances the value of the shares purchased.
As indicated in the text, the warrant price derived here di¤ers signi…cantly
from the price obtained by simply using the Black-Scholes/Merton model
naively. Because the model we have used captures much of the complexity
9In running the Monte Carlo simulation model, the time interval used is daily, and
200,000 simulations are used to obtain prices. The underlying price is $19.85, which is
calculated as in Shimko (1993) by using currently traded August puts and calls and …nding
the underlying price that best …ts with put-call parity. Unlike Shimko (1993), however, the
interest rate is not calculated through this method, but instead, the 6 month yield of 5.5%
per annum is used. Finally, the initial volatility is calculated from the estimates of the
GARCH model to be 5.3% per day on May 7. The estimated upward jump magnitude, j,i s
.307, with a corresponding jump probability of 42.4%, which were calculated as described
above.
Jof the transaction, as well as the nonlinearities in the data, we feel this price
discrepancy is an indication of the error produced when using the Black-
Scholes/Merton model in cases where its underlying assumptions are clearly
not met. When such nonlinearities as stochastic volatility and the one-point
jump process are present, it is important that they be incorporated into
pricing models.
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